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LOVING IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM:
ON EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE RIGHT TO MARRY
MARK STRASSER'

I. INTRODUCTION
A, little over thirty years ago, the United States Supreme Court struck
dowi Virginia's anti-miscegenation law in Loving v Virginia.' Subsequent
Supreme Court cases have helped to clarify both Loving in particular and the
right to marry jurisprudence more generally, although some unanswered
questions still remain, such as whether the United States Constitution protects
the' right to marry a same-sex partner. Recently, some courts have suggested
that -same-sex marriage bans implicate constitutional guarantees. 2 These
decisions have spurred commentators to reexamine the Loving line of cases in
an attempt to establish the outer contours of the right to marry.
" :S me judges and commentators suggest that Loving provides no support
for the claim that the Constitution protects the right of same-sex couples to
marry. However, their analyses tend to involve such strained and implausible
interpretations of the decision and have such unpalatable results that these
analyses bolster rather than undermine the very position that they are designed
to refute. In addition, these analyses almost systematically either ignore or
misch'aracterize subsequent developments in the right to marry jurisprudence
and subsequent explanations offered by the Court of what Loving, itself, means.
Whlife the Court has not made clear whether the right to marry includes the
right to marry a same-sex partner, the Court has made clear that the right to
marry is not nearly as limited as these commentators imply.
These disagreements about how to interpret the Loving line of cases
implicate fundamental questions about what the substantive due process and
t Mark Strasser is Professor of Law at Capital University Law School. He received his B.A. from
Harvard College, his M-A. and his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, and his J.D. from Stanford Law
School.
1. 388 US 1 (1967).
2. See Baehr v Lewin, 852 P2d 44 (Hawaii 1993), reconsideration granted in part, 875 P2d 225
(Hawaii 1993); Brause v Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super).
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equal protection guarantees of the United States Constitution protect and
about what kinds of state interests must be asserted or established if those
protections are to be overridden. At stake here is not only whether same-sex
marriages are protected by the Constitution. Rather, the outcome of these
disagreements will help to shape the constitutional protections that all citizens
enjoy.
Part II of this Article discusses Loving and the developing right to marry
jurisprudence, concluding that the right to marry is much broader than many
commentators are willing to admit. Part III of this Article discusses the Court's
developing equal protection jurisprudence in the specific context of challenges
to marital regulations. This part suggests that those arguing that same-sex
marriage bans should be upheld because such bans do not implicate issues of
race mischaracterize both Loving and the jurisprudence that has developed
since then. The Article concludes that the best reading of Loving and the
subsequent right to marry cases suggests that same-sex marriage bans violate the
equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.

II. LOVING AND THE RIGHT TO MARRY
Loving v Virginia has recently received increased scholarly attention, in part
because it helped to change "a morally indefensible status quo"3 and in part
because of two court decisions suggesting that same-sex marriages might be
constitutionally protected.4 The interpretations of Loving offered in the
secondary literature differ in important ways. The merits of these views can
only be assessed after a consideration of: (1) the facts of the case, and (2) the
jurisprudence regarding the power of the states to decide: (a) the conditions
under which their domiciliaries might marry, and (b) whether to recognize a
marriage validly celebrated in another jurisdiction.
A. THE LOVING CASE
Loving v Virginia involved an interracial couple domiciled in Virginia,
Mildred Jeter and Richard Loving, who were validly married in the District of
Columbia and who then moved back to Virginia to live.' The Lovings were

3. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Review Essay, A Social Constructionist Critique of Posner's Sex and
Reason: Steps Toward a GaylegalAgenda, 102 Yale LJ 333, 380 (1992).
4. See Baehr,852 P2d 44; Brause, 1998 WL 88743.
5. See Loving, 388 US at 2.
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charged with and convicted of violating Virginia's anti-miscegenation law.6
They each received a suspended sentence, contingent on their leaving the state
and not returning together for twenty-five years.7 They moved to Washington,
D.C.8 About four years later, they challenged Virginia's "comprehensive
statutory scheme aimed at prohibiting and punishing interracial marriages."9
The statutory scheme at issue in Loving involved: (1) a statute making it a
crime for an interracial couple domiciled in Virginia to leave the state to marry,
intending to return to Virginia to live; 0 (2) a statute making it a crime for a
white person in the state to marry someone who was not white;" and (3) a
statute establishing that interracial marriages would be treated as null and
void.'2 The Lovings' convictions were based on the Evasion Statute'3 and on the
statute criminalizing the attempt to marry a partner of a different race.'4 The
United States Supreme Court reversed those convictions,' reasoning that
"restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates
the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause." 6 The Court suggested
that under the United States Constitution "the freedom to marry, or not
marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be
infringed by the State." 7
B. THE IMPLICATIONS OF LOVING
-,-Loving raises a variety of questions. For example, under what conditions, if
any, can a state preclude two individuals from marrying? Certainly, Loving does
not establish that the Constitution precludes states from enacting any marital
regulations whatsoever. As the Court subsequently explained in Zablocki v
Redhail, 8 "reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with

deci ions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed." 9
However, as the Zablocki Court also explained, "When a statutory classification
6. Id at 3.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id at 3-4.
10.' See id (discussingVa Code Ann § 20-58 (1960)).
11. ,See id (discussing Va Code Ann § 2-59 (1960), which described the penalty for attempting to
intermarry).
12. See id at 4 n 3 (describing Va Code Ann § 20-57 (1960)).
13. See text accompanying note 10.
14. See text accompanying note 11.
15. -See Loving, 388 US at 12.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 434 US 374 (1978).
19. Id at 386.
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significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be
upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is
closely tailored to effectuate only those interests."" Thus, the Court is
suggesting both that: (1) some marital regulations are permissible, and that (2)
regulations imposing a substantial burden on the right to marry will be
examined closely by the Court to assure that the asserted state interests are in
fact sufficiently important and that the means to achieve those interests are
sufficiently narrowly tailored to the promotion of those ends.
Further analysis of Zablocki and other decisions2' is required before their
implications for the same-sex marriage debate can be made clear, although the
analyses of Loving that some commentators offer obscure rather than illuminate
the implicated issues. For example, some writers seem to focus on Virginia's
criminalization of the Lovings' marriage,22 as if the decision should merely be
understood to invalidate statutes that criminalize attempts to marry a partner
of a different race. However, such a reading can make no sense of the Loving
Court's point that "restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial
classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause."'
On the contrary, such a reading would suggest that states can restrict the right
to marry solely on the basis of race as long as they do not in addition adopt
criminal statutes to help assure that such restrictions are observed.
Suppose that one were to compare two statutory "schemes," one involving
all of the criminal laws at issue in Loving and the other involving a statute that
simply precluded individuals of different races from marrying but neither
criminalized attempts to marry someone of a different race within the
jurisdiction nor criminalized attempts to do so in a different jurisdiction.
Certainly, the two statutory schemes would differ in an important way-in
one, a domiciliary would risk criminal penalties by attempting to marry his
partner, whereas in the other the individual would "merely" be precluded from
marrying the person whom he wanted to make his lifelong spouse. Yet, it
would be an amazing reading of Loving (one that might risk the imposition of

20. Id at 388.
21. See, for example, Turner v Safley, 482 US 78 (1987).
22. But see David Orgon Coolidge, Playing the Loving Card: Same-Sex Marriageand the Politics of
Analogy, 12 BYU J Pub L 201, 219 (1998) (suggesting that a crucial difference between Loving and Baehr
was that the commission of a felony was at issue in Loving but not at issue in Baehr); Lynne Marie Kohm,
Liberty andMarriage-Baehrand Beyond: Due Processin 1998, 12 BYU J Pub L 253, 256 (1998) ("Under
the Due Process Clause, people who are married or are interested in being joined in marriage have a
constitutional liberty interest that must be recognized when state proceedings are instituted against them.
This is what happened in Loving.").
23. Loving, 388 US at 12.
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professional sanctions4 ) to suggest that Loving stood for the proposition that
states could preclude interracial couples from marrying as long as the state did
not in addition criminalize the attempt.
A variation of the above misinterpretation of Loving has been offered by
other commentators who suggest that the Due Process Clause "does not require
states to sanction certain relationships,"" but instead merely "protects an
individual from state intervention."' On this view, Loving would have been
decided differently if only the state of Virginia had not tried to intervene by
ch rging the Lovings for attempting to intermarry, but instead had merely sent
the Lovings a polite letter informing them that the state did not recognize their
marriage.' Yet, as the Zablocki Court made clear, "the right to marry is part of
thefundamental 'right of privacy' implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. " ' Thus, for example, a state that did not criminalize the
attempt to marry someone of another race but merely refused to recognize such
uniqns would nonetheless be violating the United States Constitution. Further,
the Zablocki Court also made clear that although Loving "arose in the context
f racial discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of this Court confirm
that the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals." 9
Thus, in the context of marital regulation, the Due Process Clause imposes a
greater obligation on the states than merely to refrain from threatening to
impose criminal sanctions on certain individuals who attempt to marry-it
imposes an affirmative obligation on the states not to prohibit such unions."
,Some commentators attempt to distinguish between the constitutional
issues posed by the refusal of some states in the 196 0's to recognize interracial
marriages and the constitutional issues posed by the current refusal of states to
recognize same-sex marriages in the following way: they suggest that when
Loving was decided, some but not all states permitted interracial couples to

24. ,Comments made by Justice Scalia in a different context would seem apropos here. See United States
v Virginia, 518 US 515, 594-95 (1996) ("Any lawyer who gave that advice to the Commonwealth ought to
have been either disbarred or committed.").
25. Kohm, Liberty andMarriage-BaehrandBeyond, 12 BYU J Pub L at 257 (cited in note 22).
26.-- Id.
27. See Coolidge, Playing the Loving Card, 12 BYU J Pub L at 219 (cited in note 22) (distinguishing
between what was at issue in Loving and what was at issue in Baehr by pointing out that in the latter, "no
one was charged with a felony, the State simply sent them a polite letter and returned their marriage
applications").
28. Zablocki, 434 US at 384.
29. Id.
30. The claim is not that the state can have no marital restrictions whatsoever-presumably, it is
constitutionally permissible for the state to prevent parent and child from marrying and even to impose
criminal sanctions on those engaging in incest. The claim is merely that in cases where the state is
prohibited from intervening, the state may also have an affirmative obligation to allow the union.
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marry, whereas no state currently permits same-sex couples to marry."
However, that point hardly establishes that the United States Constitution
does not protect same-sex marriage. Indeed, in the not-too-distant future when
some states recognize such marriages, commentators who currently trumpet the
importance of no state's recognition of such unions will probably suddenly
discover that the uniform lack of recognition is not a constitutionally
significant factor after all. Rather, these commentators will instead discover the
importance of allowing the states to "perform their role as laboratories for
experimentation,"" notwithstanding that the experimentation will involve "one
of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness"3 and
notwithstanding that the same argument might have been made at the time
Loving was decided in an attempt to justify permitting the states to prohibit
interracial marriages.
That some but not all states permitted interracial marriages does not
support the claim that interracial marriages implicate federal constitutional
guarantees; on the contrary, it suggests that the United States Constitution
neither requires nor prohibits the recognition of such marriages, since states
were allowed to enact the marital regulations that they saw fit.' Yet, as the
Loving Court made clear, states are prohibited by the United States
Constitution from preventing interracial couples from marrying, longstanding
past practices involving the prohibition of such unions notwithstanding. Thus,
at least for purposes of the current discussion, the important point is that prior
to Loving the lack of uniformity suggested that states had the power to decide
whether to permit interracial couples to marry, whereas after the decision it was
clear that the states had no such power.
Indeed, it is ironic that same-sex marriage opponents admit that when
Loving was decided some states permitted interracial marriages while others did
not. Many of these same commentators suggest that same-sex marriages should
not be recognized because they are not "deeply rooted in the common law
traditions of the American people" or "essential to the very concept of ordered
liberty."" Yet, given the number of states prohibiting interracial marriage at the
time that Loving was decided, it would seem difficult to argue that interracial

31. See Coolidge, Playing the Loving Card, 12 BYU J Pub L at 220 (cited in note 22) (pointing out that there
"is no place for same-sex couples to go to get married").
32. See United States vLopez, 514 US 549, 581 (1995).
33. See Loving, 388 US at 12.
34. See id at 7 (The Virginia Supreme Court pointed out that "marriage has traditionally been subject
to state regulation without federal intervention.").
35. See, for example, Lynn D. Wardle, A CriticalAnalysis of ConstitutionalClaimsfrr Same-Sex Marriage,
1996 BYU LRev 1, 28 (1996).
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marriage met those standards. As the Kentucky Supreme Court pointed out,
"miscegenation was an offense with ancient roots. " '
If one suggests that interracial marriage is constitutionally protected
because marriage itself is what is deeply rooted in the common law traditions
and thus it is not necessary for interracial marriages in particular to be rooted
in those traditions,3 7 then one offers a way that same-sex marriage might be
thought deeply rooted in the common law traditions, since the same analysis
might be offered to explain why those marriages should be protected. Further,
just as it might be argued that the recognition of interracial marriage is
essential to the concept of ordered liberty because the concept of ordered
liberty requires at the very least that something as fundamental as the right to
marry not be denied on specious grounds, the same argument might be made
concerning same-sex marriages.
C. INTERSTATE RECOGNITION OF MARRIAGE
It is not maintained here that the fact that no state currently recognizes
same-sex unions is without legal significance. On the contrary, that does have
legal significance. For example, because no state recognizes such unions, no one
has standing38 to challenge the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA),"9 which is constitutionally vulnerable on a number of grounds."0
Further, as a separate point, the inability to challenge DOMA makes it more
difficult for the Court to make clear that Congress has mischaracterized the
conditions under which states must recognize marriages validly celebrated in
sister states.
An examination of Loving illustrates why the feared "evil" prompting
DOMA-namely, that domiciliaries of a state prohibiting same-sex marriages
might marry in a different state that permitted the celebration of such
marriages and then return to their domicile demanding recognition of their
36. See Commonwealth v Wasson, 842 SW2d 487, 497 (Ky 1992).
37. See, for example, Kohm, Liberty and Marriage-Baehrand Beyond, 12 BYU J Pub L at 269 (cited in
note 22). See also Wardle, A CriticalAnalysis, 1996 BYU L Rev at 29 (cited in note 35) ("Although the

Constitution does not mention the word marriage, marriage isundeniably deeply imbedded inthe traditions of our
nation and essential to the ordered liberty of nations. Indeed, marriage status is the ultimate example of
long-established, highly preferred public status. It isofficial, formal, publidy endorsed, and powerfully protected.").
38. See US Const, Art III, § 2 (imposing case or controversy requirement).
39. Pub L 104-199, 110 Stat 2419 (1996), codified at 28 USCA § 1738C and 1USCA §7 (1997).
40. See generally Mark Strasser, Loving the Romer Out.fir Baehr: On Acts in Defense ofMarriageandthe
Constitution, 58 U Pitt L Rev 279 (1997); Mark Strasser, Ex Post Facto Laws, Bills ofAttainderand the
Definition of Punishment. On DOMA, the Hawaii Amendmentand Federal Constitutional Constraints,48
Syracuse L Rev 227 (1998) and Mark Strasser, Baker and Some Recipes for Disaster: On DOMA, Covenant
Marriages,and Full Faithand CreditJurisprudence,64 Brooklyn L Rev 307 (1998).
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union as a matter of Full Faith and Credit 4'-inaccurately characterized
existing law. Even without the passage of DOMA, states would not have been
forced by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize such unions."
However, to see why this is so, it will be necessary to distinguish some of the
different interstate marriage recognition issues raised by Loving.
Virginia's refusal to recognize the Lovings' marriage and imposition of
criminal sanctions for their attempt to marry in a jurisdiction in which such
unions could be legally celebrated might seem subject to legal challenge on a
variety of grounds. For example, it might be thought that:
1. Virginia was precluded by the Full Faith and Credit Clause from refusing
to recognize a marriage validly celebrated in another jurisdiction.43
2. Virginia's imposition of criminal sanctions against the Lovings was what
made the relevant statutes constitutionally offensive."
3. Virginia was precluded from preventing the Lovings from marrying
without having a sufficiently compelling reason to justify that marital
prohibition. 5
In Loving, there was no suggestion that Virginia was forced by the Full
Faith and Credit Clause to recognize the Lovings' marriage merely because that
union had been validly celebrated in the District of Columbia. Indeed, one
might have expected the Court to have pursued that tack were it viable, given
the Court's then-recent refusals to hold that interracial marriage bans violated
the United States Constitution. For example, about a decade earlier, the Court
had refused to hear a case challenging Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute,
allegedly because no federal issues were implicated. 6 Further, a mere three years
before Loving was decided, the Court explicitly refused to address whether
interracial marriage bans were unconstitutional. 7 Thus, if the Court could have

41. Members of Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act at least in part because they mistakenly
believed that a domicile state would be forced to recognize a marriage of its domiciliaries validly celebrated
elsewhere, regardless of local law. See Strasser, Loving the Romer Outfor Baehr, 58 U Pitt L Rev at 304-05
n 163 (cited in note 40). For a discussion of why that is a mistaken view, see Strasser, Baker and Some
Recipesfor Disaster, 64 Brooklyn L Rev at 329-34 (cited in note 40).
42. See generally Mark Strasser, JudicialGood Faithand the Baehr Essentials: On Giving Credit Where It's
Due, 28 Rutgers LJ 313 (1997).
43. Seenote41.
44. For the suggestion that Virginia's imposition of criminal sanctions was what made its actions
constitutionally offensive, see text accompanying notes 22-24.
45. See text accompanying note 20 (suggesting that marital statutes must be closely tailored to support
important state ends).
46. See Naim v Naim, 350 US 985 (1956) (denial that federal question was presented in Virginia's antimiscegenation law).
47. In McLaughlin v Florida,379 US 184 (1964) (striking down Florida's statute punishing interracial
cohabitation more severely than intraracial cohabitation), the Court explicitly refused to comment on
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avoided the issue by appealing to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, one would
have expected the Court to have done so.
Not only was there no suggestion that Evasion Statutes in general were
unconstitutional, but there further was no suggestion in Loving that Evasion
Statutes that impose a criminal penalty are constitutionally offensive." While
the Court reversed the conviction at issue, it did so because of the particular
content of that statute rather than because such statutes as a general matter are
constitutionally offensive.49 So, too, when the Court examined a Wisconsin
statutory scheme in Zablocki that both limited the right to marry' and imposed
criminal sanctions against those seeking to evade the restriction," the Court
invalidated the restriction because of its particular content rather than holding,
for example, that Evasion Statutes were unconstitutional per se. "
States had and continue to have Evasion Statutes.'3 Currently, states tend
not to criminalize the attempt to evade local law by marrying elsewhere,' but
Florida's interracial marriage ban. See id at 196 ("We accordingly invalidate § 798.05 without expressing any
views about the State's prohibition of interracial marriage, and reverse these convictions.").
48. By the same token, there was no suggestion in Zablocki that the state's criminalization of attempts to
evade the marital regulation at issue, see Zablocki, 434 US at 375 ("persons acquiring marriage licenses in
violation of the section are subject to criminal penalties"), was constitutionally offensive.
49. See Loving, 388 US at 12 (restricting right to marry on the basis of race violates the Equal
Protection Clause).
50. See 434 US at 375 ("[Wis Star % 245.10(1), (4), (5)(1973)] provides that members of a certain class
of Wisconsin residents may not marry, within the State or elsewhere, without first obtaining a court order granting
permission to marry. The class is defined by the statute to include any 'Wisconsin resident having minor issue not
in his custody and which he is under obligation to support by any court order or judgment.' The statute specifies
that court permission cannot be granted unless the marriage applicant submits proof of compliance with the
support obligation and, in addition, demonstrates that the children covered by the support order 'are not then and
are not likely thereafter to become public charges'").
51. See id at 375 ("persons acquiring marriage licenses in violation of the section are subject to criminal
penalties"). The statute applied to Wisconsin domiciliaries who sought to marry within the state or outside of the
state in violation of the prohibition. See id at 375 n 1.
52. Id at 387 ("The statutory classification at issue here, ...
clearly does interfere directly and
substantially with the right to marry.").
53. See, for example, 750 Il1
Comp Star 5/216 (West 1993) ("If any person residing and intending to
continue to reside in this state and who is disabled or prohibited from contracting marriage under the laws
of this state, shall go into another state or country and there contract a marriage prohibited and declared
void by the laws of this state, such marriage shall be null and void for all purposes in this state with the same
effect as though such prohibited marriage had been entered into in this state."); Wis Stat Ann § 765.04 (1)
(West 1993) ("If any person residing and intending to continue to reside in this state who is disabled or
prohibited from contracting marriage under the laws of this state goes into another state or country and
there contracts a marriage prohibited or declared void under the laws of this state, such marriage shall be
void for all purposes in this state with the same effect as though it had been entered into in this state.").
54. However, some states make it a crime to issue a marriage license to individuals known to be
prohibited from marrying or to officiate at a wedding of such individuals. See, for example, 750 111Comp
Stat 5/219 (West 1993) ("Any official issuing a license with knowledge that the parties are thus prohibited
from intermarrying and any person authorized to celebrate marriage who shall knowingly celebrate such a
marriage shall be guilty of a petty offense."); Mass Gen Laws Ann Ch 207 § 50 (West 1998) ("Any official
issuing a certificate of notice of intention of marriage knowing that the parties are prohibited by section
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instead "merely" refuse to recognize the marriage validly celebrated outside of
the domicile." However, the fact that states tend not to criminalize marital
evasion attempts hardly establishes that the imposition of criminal penalties for
such an offense is somehow unconstitutional. Indeed, notwithstanding that the
Supreme Court struck down the marital regulations at issue in Loving and
Zablocki, both Virginia and Wisconsin continue to have statutes that
criminalize certain attempts to evade local marital law."
Traditionally, states have been given much leeway with respect to setting
the conditions under which their domiciliaries might marry. Had the Court

held that Virginia had to give full faith and credit to the marriage validly
celebrated in the District of Columbia, the Court would have severely
undermined the general power of the states to establish marital regulations for
their domiciliaries. Thus, had the Court so ruled, Virginia domiciliaries could

have avoided any local marital regulation as long as there was another state that
did not impose the regulation at issue. Further, had the Court held that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause required Virginia to recognize the marriage
validly celebrated in the District of Columbia, the Court might also have felt
obliged to hold that Marriage Evasion Statutes57 are unconstitutional on the
theory that what the Constitution "precludes the government from
commanding directly, it also precludes the government from accomplishing
indirectly."58 Of course, this is all speculation, because the Court has never held
eleven from intermarrying, and any person authorized to solemnize marriage who shall solemnize a marriage
knowing that the parties are so prohibited, shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred or more
than five hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.").
55. See Harold P. Schombert, Note, Baehr v. Lewin: How Far Has the Door Been Opened? Finding a
State Policyfor Recognizing Same-Sex Marriages, 16 Women's Rts L Rep 331, 341 (1995) ("In those states
that have used marriage evasion statutes .... the usual penalty is to void the marriage in the forum state.").
In addition, some states have enacted legislation intended to bolster other states' Evasion Statutes by saying that
marriages that might validly be celebrated within the state will nonetheless be void if contrary to the law of the
couple's domicile. See 750 I1 Comp Stat 5/217 (West 1993) ("No marriage shall be contracted in this state
by a party residing and intending to continue to reside in another state or jurisdiction if such marriage
would be void if contracted in such other state or jurisdiction and every marriage celebrated in this state in
violation of this provision shall be null and void."); Mass Gen Laws Ann Ch 207 § 1I (West 1998) ("No
marriage shall be contracted in this commonwealth by a party residing and intending to continue to reside
in another jurisdiction if such marriage would be void if contracted in such other jurisdiction, and every
marriage contracted in this commonwealth in violation hereof shall be null and void.").
56. See Wis Stat Ann § 765.30 (West 1993) (penalty for going outside of the state to marry in order to
circumvent state marriage laws); Va Code Ann § 20-40 (Michie 1995) (penalty for going out of state to marry
someone within prohibited degrees of consanguinity).
57. The Commissioners have withdrawn approval of the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act. See the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act 1970 § 210 cmt (amended 1973), 9A ULA 176 (1973). While the
withdrawal of approval might suggest that such Acts are unwise as a policy matter, it does not at all establish
that such acts are unconstitutional.
58. Rutan v Republican Party ofIllinois, 497 US 62, 78 (1990). See also Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1, 17
(1958) ("In short, the constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated against in school admission
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that the domicile at the time of the marriage's celebration is forced to recognize
that union as long as it is validly celebrated elsewhere." Both before and after
the passage of DOMA, states could refuse to recognize their domiciliaries'
same-sex marriages validly celebrated elsewhere, as long as those marriages
could not be celebrated within the domicile and as long as that prohibition
itself does not offend constitutional guarantees.
In Loving, the Court neither cast doubt on the general power of states to
determine the conditions under which their domiciliariesmight marry nor cast
doubt on the power of states to pass Evasion Statutes, but instead suggested
that states were prohibited from restricting marriage on the basis of race.
Because the Virginia statute involved "invidious racial discrimination,"' the
Court held that the statute at issue violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution."'
Yet, it should not be thought that the Court will only strike down a
marital statute on equal protection grounds if it discriminates on the basis of
race. In Zablocki, the Court held that the Wisconsin marital statute violated
equal protection guarantees,' notwithstanding that race was not implicated in
the challenged classification. While the Wisconsin statute arguably also
implicated due process guarantees,63 the Zablocki holding should have laid to
rest the suggestion that only marital statutes discriminating on the basis of race
will be held to violate the Equal Protection Clause.' Nonetheless, in part
because of the emphasis on equal protection in Loving 5 and in part because
some courts have suggested that same-sex marriage bans implicate equal
on grounds of race or color declared by this Court in the Brown case can neither be nullified openly and
directly by state legislators or state executive or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through
evasive schemes for segregation."). But see CivilAeronautics Bd. v Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 US 316, 328
(1961) (rejecting that the Board has "the power to do indirectly what it cannot do directly").
59. Constitutional guarantees might well be implicated if the scenario were somewhat different.
Suppose that a couple marries in their domicile according to local law but then a few years later moves to a new
jurisdiction that does not recognize such unions, and the latter state refuses to recognize the marriage. For a
discussion of this scenario, see generally Mark Strasser, For Whom Bell Tolls: On Subsequent Domiciles'
Refsingto Recognize Same-Sex Marriages,66 U Cin L Rev 339 (1998).
60. Loving, 388 US at 11.
61. See id at 12 (statute violates Equal Protection Clause). The Court also made clear that the statute
violated the Due Process Clause. See id (statute violates Due Process Clause).
62. See Zablocki, 434 US at 382 ("We agree with the District Court that the statute violates the Equal
Protection Clause.").
63. See id at 392 (Stewart concurring in the judgment) ("I think that the Wisconsin statute is unconstitutional
because it exceeds the bounds of permissible state regulation of marriage, and invades the sphere of liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); id at 400 (Powell concurring in the judgment) ("The
Wisconsin measure in this case does not pass muster under either due process or equal protection standards.").
64. But see text accompanying notes 69-83.
65., In Loving, the Court discussed the equal protection issues for most of the opinion. See Loving, 388
SUS at 1-11.
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protection guarantees,' some commentators have concentrated on the racial
aspect of Loving's equal protection analysis in an attempt to show why Loving is
allegedly irrelevant insofar as same-sex marriage is at issue.
iII. LOVING AND EQUAL PROTECTION
The competing interpretations of Loving's equal protection analysis
emphasize different factual elements of the case or different aspects of the
opinion itself. Regrettably, some interpretations focus on particular facts
without regard to the role that those facts played in the opinion or in the
Court's reasoning, thereby mischaracterizing both the decision itself and the
part it has played in the developing right to marry jurisprudence. For example,
some commentators suggest that the statute at issue in Loving was
unconstitutional because it limited the options of white people, 7 whereas other
commentators suggest that the statute was unconstitutional because it
specifically implicated race.68 However, even on the most charitable reading of
these interpretations, these commentators conflate what sufficed to make the
statute unconstitutional with what was required to make it unconstitutional.
Because of this conflation, these interpretations can neither account for the
right to marry jurisprudence that has developed since Loving nor even the
Court's own comments about what Loving itself represents. The best
understanding of Loving and the right to marry jurisprudence as it has
developed since then suggests that same-sex marriage bans implicate federal
equal protection guarantees and that states will have great difficulty in offering
the requisite justifications for those statutes.
A. TREATING THE RACES UNEQUALLY
Some commentators suggest that the statute at issue in Loving was
unconstitutional because the "Virginia statute did not treat the races
equally; it more strictly limited white persons' marriage options."' Yet,
such an analysis is potentially misleading in a few different respects.
First, insofar as this suggests that the Court's concern was that whites in
particular were being treated unfairly, there is nothing in the opinion to
support that view, since the Court's unfairness concern was that the
66. See, for example, Baehr, 852 P2d at 64; Brause, 1998 WL 88743 at *6.
67. See, for example, Jay Alan Sekulow and John Tuskey, Sex and Sodomy andApples and Oranges-Does the
ConstitutionRequire States to Granta Right to Do the Impossible?, 12 BYU J Pub L 309, 324 (1998).
68. See, for example, Wardle, A CriticalAnalysis,1996 BYU L Rev at 80 (cited in note 35) (suggesting that
the central issue in Loving is invidious discrimination on the basis of race).
69. Sekulow and Tuskey, Sex and Sodomy andApples and Oranges, 12 BYU J Pub L at 324 (cited in note 67).
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statute was "designed to maintain White Supremacy."" Second, this
interpretation might be thought to imply that the Court would have
upheld the statute if only the marital options of whites had been no
more severely restricted than the options of members of other races, a
view belied by the Court's comments in the opinion itself.
Suppose that Virginia had passed a different statute. Suppose that in an
attempt to "preserve the racial integrity of its citizens"" and to prevent the
"obliteration of racial pride,"' the state of Virginia had banned all interracial
marriages rather than only those involving whites." One infers that these
commentators would suggest that such a statutory scheme would pass
constitutional muster, because the marital options of the races would have been
limited equally. Yet, such a suggestion is inconsistent with the Loving opinion
itself. First, the focus of such an analysis is on the marital options of the race
rather than of the individual, thereby undercutting the Loving Court's
recognition that the freedom to marry is "one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness."' Second, the analysis cannot
plausibly account for the Loving Court's having found "the racial classifications
in these statutes repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, even assuming an
even-handed state purpose to protect the 'integrity' of all races" 75 and even
assuming an equal application of the statute. 76 Thus, those who focus on the
limitations of whites' options when explaining Loving offer a misleading
characterization in several respects.
B. WHICH CLASSIFICATIONS REQUIRE CLOSE EXAMINATION?
The above discussion is about why the statute at issue in Loving involved
invidious discrimination rather than about whether it did. Yet, the state of
Virginia denied that its marital statutes imposed unequal burdens and denied
that the statutes were unconstitutional, arguing that "because its miscegenation
statutes punish equally both the white and the Negro participants in an
70. Loving, 388 US at 11.
71. See id at 7 (quoting Naim v Naim,87 SE2d 749, 756 (1955)).
72. Id.
73. A separate issue would involve how the different races were defined, since "white person" would
only apply "to such person as has no trace whatever of any blood other than Caucasian; but persons who
have one-sixteenth or less of the blood of the American Indian and have no other non-Caucasic blood shall
be deemed to be white persons." See id at n 4. However, the rules for other races were less strict. This might
be relevant insofar as one is examining whether the state is really worried about the "corruption of blood,"
see id at 7, of all of its citizens.
74. Id at 12 (italics added).
75. Seeidatllnll.
76. Id at 8.
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interracial marriage, these statutes, despite their reliance on racial
classifications, do not constitute an invidious discrimination based upon
race."' The Court did not dispute the state's characterization of the statute,"
but instead rejected "the notion that the mere 'equal application' of a statute is
enough to remove the classification from the Fourteenth Amendment's
proscription of all invidious racial discrimination."" The Court made clear that
when a statute employing racial classifications is at issue, "the fact of equal
application does not immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of
justification which the Fourteenth Amendment traditionally required of state
statutes drawn according to race."8
The Court distinguished Loving from other kinds of cases in which no
minority was being targeted,' suggesting that in the latter "the Court has
merely asked whether there is any rational foundation for the discriminations,
and has deferred to the wisdom of the state legislatures." 2 The Loving Court's
approach is important to consider because it suggests the approach that should
be used insofar as the constitutionality of a statute precluding same-sex
marriage is at issue.
C. DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEX
A same-sex marriage ban might be phrased in any of a number of ways. For
example, a state might suggest that marriages between individuals of the same
sex are invalid, 3 that marriages between individuals of the same gender are
void,84 or that only marriages between a man and a woman are valid." Each of
these statutes classifies on the basis of sex or gender. A separate question is

77. See id.
78. But see Allison Moore, Loving' Legacy: The OtherAntidiscriminationPrinciples, 34 Harv CR-CL L
Rev 163 (1999) ("Loving involved a law that was in fact neutral as between black and white persons who
married interracially--punishing them equally for miscegenation.").
79. Loving, 388 US at 8.
80. Id at 9.
81. See id at 8-9. The Court offered two examples of cases involving lower scrutiny, Railway Express
Agency, Inc. v New York, 336 US 106 (1949) (traffic regulation) and Allied Stores v Bowers, 358 US 522
(1959) (state gave nonresidents a tax advantage).
82. Idat 9.
83. See Ala Code § 30-1-19 (1998) ("A marriage contracted between individuals of the same sex is
invalid in this state."); Ark Code Ann § 9-11-109 (1998) ("Marriage shall be only between a man and a
woman. A marriage between persons of the same sex is void.").
84. Del Code Ann Tit 13 § 101 (a) (Supp 1996) ("A marriage is prohibited and void ... between
persons of the same gender.").
85. See Alaska Const, Art 1, § 25 ("To be valid in this State, a marriage may exist only between one
man and one woman.").
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whether the statute involves invidious discrimination, but it at least should be
clear that the above formulations are sex-based or gender-based classifications.86
When commentators suggest that same-sex marriage bans do not
discriminate on the basis of gender," they might mean: (a) the basis of the
classification is something other than sex or gender, for example, orientation,
or (b) while the basis of the classification is sex or gender, the classification is
not invidious and hence should not be thought of as "discrimination." These
claims must not be conflated, because they mean different things and because
the test to determine whether in fact the Constitution permits the classification
at issue might depend on which was being asserted.
Suppose that a different statute were at issue, namely, one that only
precluded individuals with a same-sex orientation from contracting same-sex
marriages. Individuals who did not have a same-sex orientation would be
allowed to marry someone of the same sex and thus, for example, receive
government benefits that they would not otherwise be able to receive." Because
the state would want to assure that only certain same-sex couples married, it
might require each member of the couple to sign an affidavit that he or she
either had an opposite-sex orientation or no sexual orientation.
It might seem that a state requirement of such an affidavit would itself
"raise serious constitutional questions. "89 Yet, it is not as if requiring the
production of an affidavit as a condition for being allowed to marry is
unprecedented-Wisconsin, for example, imposes such a requirement in
certain situations."
The statute described above would not involve express discrimination on
the basis of sex, since the explicit basis of classification would instead involve
sexual orientation. Of course, that would not end the possibility of an equal
86. But see text accompanying notes 103-08 and 189-90 (discussing different claims that such statutes
do not involve a sex-based classification in the relevant sense).
87. See Sekulow and Tuskey, Sex and Sodomy andApples and Oranges, 12 BYU J Pub L at 323 (cited in
note 67) ("The obvious rejoinder to this argument is that state marriage laws treat men and women alike:
Billy may no more marry Bobby than Sue may marry Linda. Thus, these laws discriminate against neither
men nor women."); Anita K. Blair, Constitutional Equal Protection, Strict Scrutiny, and The Politics of
MarriageLaw, 47 Cath U L Rev 1231, 1238 (1998) ("Sex discrimination simply does not enter into
Hawaii's marriage law- women and men are treated precisely the same.").
88. See Sondrea Joy King, Note, Ya'll Cain 't Do That Here: Will Texas Recognize Same-Sex Marriages
Validly Contractedin Other States?, 2 Tex Wesleyan L Rev 515, 551 (1996) (posing hypothetical of two
heterosexual women who wish to marry for economic benefits).
89. See Adams v Howerton, 486 F Supp 1119, 1125 (C D Cal 1980), affd, 673 F2d 1036 (9th Cir
1982). The Adams court believed that a state's requiring individuals to reveal their plans regarding children
might implicate privacy concerns. See id.
90. See Wis Stat § 765.03 (West 1993) ("marriage may be contracted between first cousins where the
female has attained the age of 55 years or where either party, at the time of application for a marriage
license, submits an affidavit signed by a physician stating that either party is permanently sterile").
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protection challenge on the basis of sex. For example, if the state precluded all
individuals from marrying a same-sex partner regardless of the sexual
orientation of the parties, express provisions of the statute notwithstanding,
then an applied challenge to the statute on the basis of sex-discrimination
might be appropriate."'
A separate question is whether the state could justify permitting some but
not other same-sex couples to marry. Presumably, it would not suffice as a
justification were the State to suggest that it had enacted that regulation
because it had wanted to punish individuals with a same-sex orientation, since
the Court has already made clear that where a statute "seems inexplicable by
anything but animus toward the class that it affects, it lacks a rational
relationship to legitimate state interests."' 3
Perhaps the state would argue that it was imposing such a restriction
because it wanted to make sure that sodomitical relations did not take place.
Of course, for the majority of states, such a justification would hardly be
convincing, since the fact that they do not criminalize sodomy belies the claim
that its prevention is an important state objective."4 Further, since many of the
states criminalizing sodomy criminalize both same-sex and different-sex
sodomy,9 one would expect those states to impose the same restriction on all
couples, for example, by requiring them to sign an affidavit suggesting that
they had no inclination to engage in sodomitical activities in the future.
Finally, since it seems likely that the right to have marital, consensual,
sodomitical relations is protected by the right to privacy," it is not at all clear
that the state could impose a no-sodomy condition on those who wished to
marry.' For all of these reasons, it seems unlikely that the prevention of
sodomy would be viewed as a sufficient justification for such a statute."
91. In Baehr, the plurality suggested that the Hawaii statute at issue, "on its face and as applied,
regulates access to the marital status and its concomitant rights and benefits on the basis of the applicants'
sex," see Baehr, 852 P2d at 64, thus suggesting that a statute might be vulnerable either because of its
express provisions or because of how it was applied.
92. But see Romer vEvans, 517 US 620, 644 (1996) (Scalia dissenting) (suggesting that animus against
this
particular group is constitutionally permissible).
93. See id at 632.
94. As of January 21, 2000, the ACLU website http://www.aclu.org/issues/ga)/sodomy.htnil listed
fourteen states that criminalize both same-sex and opposite-sex sodomitical relations and five states that
criminalize only same-sex sodomitical relations.
95. See id.
96. See Bowers v Hardwick, 478 US 186, 218 (1986) (Stevens dissenting) ("our prior cases thus establish
that a State may not prohibit sodomy within 'the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms'").
97. Commentators' claims to the contrary notwithstanding, see Wardle, A CriticalAnaysis, 1996 BYU L
Rev at 35 (cited in note 35), Bowers v Hardwick did not hold that the state could prohibit sodomy altogether.
The Court did not address whether marital sodomy was protected because that issue was not before the
Court. It is thus difficult to see why Bowers would be an insurmountable hurdle for the constitutional
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Many would suggest that it would be absurd to have the statute described
above that allowed some but not other same-sex couples to marry, although the
explanations for why that was true might vary radically. Some would claim that
it makes no sense to allow any same-sex couple to marry, arguing that the
purposes of marriage could not be served if the marital partners were of the
same sex." Others would suggest that exactly the wrong same-sex couples
would thereby have been precluded, arguing those same-sex partners whose
union would have served the purposes of marriage would be precisely those
who would have been precluded from marrying.'" In any event, the same-sex
marriage bans that have been enacted do not allow certain but not other samesex couples to marry; instead, they prohibit "same-sex marriages on the part of
professed or non-professed heterosexuals, homosexuals, bisexuals, or
asexuals."' It is precisely because all parties, regardless of sexual orientation,
are prohibited from marrying someone of the same sex that the Baehrplurality
held that the Hawaii statute "on its face and as applied, regulates access to the
marital status and its concomitant rights and benefits on the basis of the
applicants' sex. '°2
Professor Richard F. Duncan argues that notwithstanding that a same-sex
marriage ban facially discriminates on the basis of sex, it involves "an eminently
reasonable distinction drawn on the basis of sexual orientation.""5° He seems
not to appreciate that given that such a statute nonetheless precludes a man
from marrying another man and a woman from marrying another woman

protection of same-sex marriage as Professor Wardle suggests. See id at 36 ("Bower presents an
insurmountable hurdle to any claim for
a same-sex constitutional right").
98. In Romer, Justice Scalia suggested in dissent that the state constitutional amendment at issue was
constitutional because the state could have criminalized sodomy, see Romer, 517 US at 642 (Scalia
dissenting), even though it had in fact
chosen not to do so. See id at 645. Justice Scalia would presumably
suggest that marital sodomy for same-sex individuals was not constitutionally protected, notwithstanding
that the reasons supporting the protection of different-sex marital sodomy would also support protecting
same-sex marital sodomy, and that therefore the state would be permitted to enact such legislation. In
Bowers, the Court seemed oblivious (see Bowers, 478 US at 190--the Court only addressed whether "the
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy," notwithstanding that
the statute at issue made no such distinction, see id at 200 (Blackmun dissenting)) to the fact
that the
rationales for claiming that same-sex sodomy was not constitutionally protected-for example, that such
proscriptions have "ancient roots," see id at 192-would apply with equal force to establish that differentsex sodomy was not constitutionally protected.
99. See text accompanying notes 154-73.
100. See text accompanying notes 153-62.
101. See Baehr,852 P2d at 71 (Heen dissenting).
102. Id at 64.
103. Richard F. Duncan, From Loving to Romer. HomosexualMarriageandMoralDiscernment, 12 BYI J Pub
L239, 243 (1998).
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without regard to the sexual orientations of the parties,' "° the statute is not
narrowly tailored.' 5 He also seems not to appreciate how the constitutionality
of such a statute is undercut if the very reason that such marriages are
precluded involves a desire to impose a burden on and maintain the inferiority
of a particular class.'" Laws of that kind "raise the inevitable inference that the
disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons
affected."'0 " The Romer Court has already made clear that a statute that
"classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them
unequal to everyone else"'0 8 will not pass constitutional muster.
When holding that the state's same-sex marriage ban implicated equal
protection guarantees, the Baehr plurality did not hold that the classification at
issue was invidious or unconstitutional.' 9 Instead, it remanded the case to give
the state an opportunity to establish that the statute was "justified by
compelling state interests""' and that the "statute ... [was] narrowly drawn to
avoid unnecessary abridgements of the applicant couples' constitutional
rights."' By remanding the case, the Baehr plurality made clear that the fact
that the state had chosen to enact a statute containing a sex-based classification
did not establish that the statute was constitutionally infirm."2 That issue was
left for a trial court to determine."' Nonetheless, the plurality's holding that
the statute involved a sex-based classification was significant because the state
was thereby required to carry a "heavy burden of justification" when making its
argument at the trial court level."'
When a sex-based classification is under examination, several issues must
be addressed, including: (1) whether burdens are imposed on one sex that are
not imposed on the other, and (2) even if not, whether the statute is closely

104. Id at 241 ("Marriage laws apply the same equal standard to each gender-neither men nor women may
marry a person of the same gender").
105. See Craig M. Bradley, The Right Not to Endorse Gay Rights: A Reply to Sunstein, 70 Ind L J 29, 34
(1994) ("A ban on same-sex marriages is not perfectly tailored to further the governmental interest in not
giving homosexual relationships legal recognition, since it forbids people of the same sex from entering into
a legally recognized 'marriage' regardless of their sexual proclivities (or lack of same)").
106. See Duncan, From Loving to Romer, 12 BYU J Pub L at 239 (cited in note 103) (discussing the "radical
and dangerous agenda" of those who allege the "equal goodness of homosexuality and heterosexuality").
107. See Romer, 517 US at 634.
108. Idat635.
109. See Baehr, 852 P2d at 67.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Michael M. v Superior Court, 450 US 464 (1981) (upholding sex-based statutory rape
classification).
113. In Baehr v Miike, 1996 WL 694235 (Hawaii Cir Ct), a Hawaii trial court determined that the state
had failed to meet its burden. See id at *21.
114. Seeidat*19.
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tailored to promote sufficiendy important state interests.' 5 Thus, even if it
could be established that a particular sex-based classification did not impose an
unfair burden on one of the sexes, that would not suffice to establish the
constitutionality of the classification.
Commentators suggest that same-sex marriage bans treat men and women
alike" -- a man is not allowed to marry another man and a woman is not
allowed to marry another woman. Yet, this hardly establishes that such a
classification passes constitutional muster, just as the analogous claim in
Loving"'--that blacks were not allowed to marry whites and whites were not
allowed to marry blacks-did not establish that the Virginia statute passed
constitutional muster.
There has been some confusion about the point that just as the "equal"
treatment of the races did not constitutionally immunize an interracial ban, so,
too, the "equal" treatment of the sexes would not constitutionally immunize a
same-sex marriage ban." 8 The claim is not that Loving establishes that "the civil
right to marriage must be afforded to same sex couples,""' since that case did
not involve a challenge to a same-sex marriage ban and thus of course is not
authority for that proposition. Thus, because Loving involved a race-based
marital classification, the case does not "limit the state's power to prohibit any
person from entering into a same-sex marriage, " ' just as it does not limit the

state's power to prohibit any person from entering into a marriage with
someone of a different religion. However, the fact that a case is not authority
for a particular proposition hardly establishes that it is not relevant or in fact
very persuasive. For example, Loving strongly suggests that a law barring
marriages between individuals of different religions would be unconstitutional,
since religion is also a suspect classification.'
It is not suggested above that the state's burden in justifying a marital
statute involving a sex-based classification would be as great as it would be were

115. See Zablocki, 434 US at 387.
116. See text accompanying note 104.
117. See Baehr, 852 P2d at 67 (noting that the two claims seemed analogous).
118. See, for example, Wardle, A CriticalAnalysis, 1996 BYU L Rev at 784-85 (cited in note 35) ("The
Loving analogy between antimiscegenation laws and laws allowing only heterosexual marriage fails as a
matter of case interpretation and constitutional doctrine .. . Nothing in the Court's equal protection
analysis or language implies disapproval of discrimination against same-sex relations or even hints of any
concern about permitting only male-female marriage.").
119. See Baehr, 852 P2d at 70 (Heen dissenting).
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. See Burlington Northern RailroadCo. v Ford,504 US 648, 651 (1992) (discussing "suspect lines like
race or religion"); City of New Orleans v Dukes, 427 US 297, 303 (1976) (discussing "inherently suspect
distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage").
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the statute to involve a race- or religion-based classification. Sex- or gender-

based classifications must be subjected to heightened scrutiny,'

a level of

scrutiny that is lower than that which is employed for classifications involving
race or religion'24 but higher than that which is employed where economic
regulations are at issue.'25 Nonetheless, heightened scrutiny imposes a difficult
burden on parties who seek to, defend a sex-based classification. As the Court
made clear in United Statesv Virginia,"7 "Parties who seek to defend genderbased government action must demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive
justification' for that action.""'
D. ON THE FAMILY
Notwithstanding that same-sex couples are not yet able to marry in any
state, gays and lesbians are creating "families of choice"'' in which they
establish homes and raise children."' Lesbian and gay parents, like other
parents, provide home environments in which children can thrive'3' and, like
other parents, have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and
management of their children,'32 whether the connection to those children is
the result of biology or adoption.'33

123. See Kohm, Liberty and Marriage-Baehrand Beyond, 12 BYU J Pub L at 260-61 (cited in note 22)
(distinguishing between the kinds of scrutiny to be imposed where race-based rather than sex-based
classifications are at issue).
124. See Wardle, A CriticalAnalysis, 1996 BYU L Rev at 83 (cited in note 35) ("race and gender are not
fungible categories because race triggers the strictest standard of judicial scrutiny, whereas gender
discrimination invokes an intermediate, albeit heightened, standard of judicial review"). In Baehr, the
classification was to be examined with strict scrutiny because sex is a suspect classification under the Hawaii
Constitution. See Baehr, 852 P2d at 67.
125. See text accompanying notes 81-82 (discussing rational basis review).
126. Blair, Constitutional Equal Protection, 47 Cath U L Rev at 1234 (cited in note 85) ("The U.S.
Supreme Court has insisted, rather, that constitutional equal protection scrutiny, whether applied to race or
sex or other classifications, must involve a rigorous examination of the actual purposes and effects of the
laws or state actions under challenge.").
127. 518 US 515 (1996).
128. See id at 531 (citations omitted).
129. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing Conditionsfor
Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship, 1961-1981, 25 Hofstra L Rev 817, 939 (1997).
130. See Dean v District of Columbia, 653 A2d 307, 333 (DC App 1995) (Ferren concurring and
dissenting) ("we recognize that gay and lesbian couples can and do have children through adoption, surrogacy, and
artificial insemination").
131. See Baehr, 1996 WL 694235 at "17 (Lesbian and gay parents can provide children with homes in
which they will be happy, healthy and well-adjusted.).
132. See Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 753 (1982).
133. See, for example, Ohio Rev Code Ann § 3107.15 (Anderson 1996) (adoptive parent has all of the
rights and responsibilities that the biological parent had with respect to the child); Conn Gen Star Ann §
4
5a-731 (West 1993) (same); Alaska Code Ann § 25.23.130 (1995) (same).
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The existence of lesbian and gay families is legally significant in two very
different ways. Their existence: (1) provides the basis for a substantive due
process claim that the right to marry a same-sex partner should be recognized
as constitutionally protected, and (2) helps to illustrate why the state does not
have an exceedingly persuasive justification for precluding same-sex couples
from marrying.
A plausible argument can be made for the proposition that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of same sex couples to
marry. Consider two cases, Meyer v Nebraska," in which the Court recognized
that the Due Process Clause protects the "right of the individual ...to marry,
establish a home, and bring up children" 35 and Zablocki, in which the Court
suggested that it "would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy with
respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to
enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society.""5
The Meyer Court suggested that the rights to marry, establish a home, and
bring up children are fundamental and equally important. 37 The Zablocki
Court explicitly confirmed both that "the right to marry is of fundamental
importance" 38 and that "the decision to marry has been placed on the same
level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child
rearing, and family relationships."'39 Yet, if indeed lesbian and gay parents have
the fundamental right to make decisions regarding their children, and the right
to marry is on the same level of importance as that right, then Zablocki
provides strong support for the constitutional right of lesbians and gays to
marry their same-sex partners.'4 ° As the Zablocki Court recognized, the
alternative "would make little sense."'41 Of course, Zablocki did not establish the
"right to a same sex marriage, " 42 since the Wisconsin regulation instead

134. 262 US 390 (1923).
135. Idat399.
136. Zablocki, 434 US at 386.
137. See text accompanying note 135. See also Boddie v Connecticut,401 US 371,376 (1971) ("marriage
involves interests of basic importance in our society").
138. Zablocki, 434 US at 383.
139. Id at 386. See also Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg concurring) ("The
entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that clearly underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate
that the rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude as the
fundamental rights specifically protected.").
140. The Baehrplurality made dear that commentators will be unable to avoid the force of this argument
by simply suggesting that marriage by definition cannot include same-sex couples. See Baehr,852 P2d at 62.
See also Mark Strasser, Legally Wed Same-Sex Marriageand the Constitutionch I (Cornell 1997) (discussing
the definitional preclusion argument).
141. Zablocki, 434 US at 386.
142. See Baehr, 852 P2d at 70 (Heen dissenting).
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involved a different marital restriction, but the Zablocki Court's reasoning is
nonetheless highly instructive. " '
The Baehr court rejected that the right to marry a same-sex partner was
protected by the right to privacy.' Basically, the court reasoned that because "a
right to same-sex marriage is [not] so rooted in the traditions and collective
conscience of our people that failure to recognize it would violate the
fundamental principles of liberty and justice that lie at the base of all our civil
'
and political institutions"45
and that because "a right to same-sex marriage is
[not] implicit in the concept of ordered liberty such that neither liberty nor
justice would exist if it were sacrificed,""146 due process did not protect such a
right. The Baehr court did not seem to appreciate that the same argument
might have been used to defeat the claim made in Loving.'7
Ironically, the Baehr plurality recognized that the Zablocki Court had
linked "the right to marry, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of
procreation, childbirth, abortion, and child rearing on the other."'4 8 However,
the court then came up with the surprising conclusion that because "one is
simply the logical predicate of the others,' ' 4 9 same-sex marriages need not be
recognized. Yet, if indeed same-sex couples are having and raising children and
if indeed the Court was pointing to a logical connection between marriage on
the one hand and having and raising children on the other, one would have
thought that the Baehr court would have felt logically compelled to recognize
the right to marry a same-sex partner.
E. HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY
Bracketing whether courts should recognize the right to marry a same-sex
partner as protected by due process guarantees, the existence of lesbian and gay
families helps to undermine the claim that the state has an exceedingly
persuasive justification for its refusal to recognize same-sex marriages. To

143. Marriage serves other additional individual interests that would be at least asimportant for same-sex
couples asfor different-sex couples. See Turner,482 US at 95-96 (cited in note 21) (discussing important
attributes of marriage including that such unions "are expressions of emotional support and public
commitment," that marriage can have a "spiritual significance" and thus may be "an exercise of religious
faith as well as an expression of personal dedication," and that "marital status often is a precondition to the
receipt of government benefits (e.g., Social Security benefits), property rights (e.g., tenancy by the entirety,
inheritance rights), and other, less tangible benefits (e.g., legitimation of children born out of wedlock)").
144. See Baehr, 852 P2d at 57.
145. id.
146. Id.
147. See text accompanying notes 35-36.
148. See Baehr, 852 P2d at 56.
149. Id.
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demonstrate that a sex-based classification withstands constitutional scrutiny,
the state must show that the classification serves an important governmental
objective and that the discriminatory means are substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives. 1" However, claims to the contrary
notwithstanding,' the justifications offered for such statutes do not meet the
relevant standard. Indeed, the only reason that such statutes might even appear
to serve such ends is that commentators have artificiallyconstrued the purposes
of marriage.
Courts have long recognized that the state has a "compelling interest in
encouraging and fostering procreation of the race and providing status and
stability to the environment in which children are raised."152 Yet, this interest
would not support preventing same-sex couples from marrying, given that they
are having and raising children. On the contrary, this would support the right
to marry a same-sex partner, since that would lend status and stability to the
environment in which the children might be raised.'
When commentators seek to establish why same-sex couples should not be
allowed to marry, they sometimes point to the need that children have for a
long-term, stable environment." Of course, this is a reason that same-sex
marriages should be recognized, unless one adds an additional condition,
namely, that the long-term, stable environment must involve both of the
children's biological parents.' However, since children need a long-term stable
environment even if that setting does not involve both of their biological
parents, there is no legitimate reason to add such a qualifier.
The state has an interest in having children raised in a loving home where
they might flourish, even if only one or perhaps neither parent is biologically
related to the children.56 Indeed, when the Loving Court suggested that
150. See Virginia, 518 US at 533 (cited in note 127).
151. See Coolidge, Playingthe Loving Card, 12 BYU J Pub L at 208 (cited in note 22) (suggesting that
the classification is not invidious). See also Wardle, A CriticalAnalysis, 1996 BYU L Rev at 62 (cited in note
35) ("laws permitting only heterosexual marriage could survive strict judicial scrutiny").
152. See Adams, 486 F Supp at 1124 (cited in note 89).
153. Same-sex partners are sometimes allowed to adopt the child of their partners to enhance stability for
the child, among other reasons. See Adoption of Tammy, 619 NE2d 315, 320 (1993) ('Of equal, if not
greater significance, adoption will enable Tammy to preserve her unique filial ties to Helen in the event that
Helen and Susan separate, or Susan predeceases Helen.").
154. See Blair, ConstitutionalEqual Protection, 47 Cath U L Rev at 1236 (cited in note 87) ("Human
children (unlike other animals' young) require years of care and attention before they are self-sufficient.").
155. John Finnis tries to add such a condition. See John Finnis, Law, Morality,and "Sexual Orientation"
in John Corvino, ed, Same-Sex: Debatingthe EthicsScience and Culture ofHomosexuality 31, 37 (Rowman &
Littlefield 1997).
156. See Mark Strasser, The Challenge of Same-Sex Marriage: Federalist Principles and Constitutional
Protections 2 (Greenwood 1999) ("the state has an interest in having healthy and flourishing children
produced and raised, even if those children are not raised by both of their biological children.").
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marriage is "fundamental to our very existence and survival,""' 7 there was no
indication in the opinion that the survival of the race was somehow dependent
on children being raised by both of their biological parents. ' Were that the
case, one would expect that adoption laws would be quite different from what
they in fact are. Not only would states not treat the adoptive parent as the legal
equivalent of the biological parent,'" but states would take a much more active
role in discouraging adoptions.
Other commentators offer a different reason that the inability of same-sex
couples to produce a child through their union is allegedly relevant to whether
they should be allowed to marry. For example, Professor Teresa Stanton
Collett points out that same-sex unions "may mirror the commitment,
exclusivity, and permanence of marriage, but they can never create new human
life."'60 Because such unions would allegedly therefore be "finite and sterile,"
the state "has no stake in the sexual union of these couples.' 6 2
At the very least, this is a surprising argument, since it implies that the sole
reason that the state has a "stake" in the sexual union of couples is that the
couple might thereby produce children. Yet, the state would also have a stake
in the couple's sexual union insofar as that might help them stay together,
which would provide stability both for the individuals themselves and for any
children that they might be raising. Further, Professor Collett's argument
suggests that there is nothing in a marriage outside of the potentially procreative
sexual union in which the state has a stake. Yet, that argument fails to include
some of the state's other interests in marriage. For example, the state has an
interest in its citizens being happy and productive members of society, and the
state's promoting marriage furthers that interest regardless of whether that
family unit involves any children.
As a separate point, the mere lack of a stake in the sexual union would
hardly be a reason to prohibit the union. More would have to be shown, for
example, that the state has a stake in prohibiting individuals from marrying
who could not produce children through their union. Yet, if that really were an
important state interest, one would expect the state to require that individuals
157. Loving, 388 US at 12.
158. Professor Wardle seems not to appreciate this point. See Wardle, A CriticalAnalysis,1996 BYU L Rev
at 80-81 (cited in note 35). Since children can flourish in non-marital settings, recognition of neither same-sex
nor different-sex marriage is necessary for the survival of the race. Of course, the argument here is that both
types of marriage should be recognized whether or not that recognition is necessary for the survival of
humankind.
159. See note 133 and accompanying text.
160.

Teresa Stanton Collett, Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage:Askingfor the Impossible?, 47 Cath U L Rev 1245,

1268 (1998).
161. Id.
162. Id.
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be able and willing to procreate before allowing them to marry, for example, by
submitting the requisite affidavits.'6 One would never expect a state to impose
as a condition of marriage that the couple not be able to procreate. However,
states do not require the production of such an affidavit, and further, several
states will only allow certain individuals to marry if they can establish their
inabilityto produce children through their union."
Some commentators seem intent on establishing why different-sex
marriages are better than same-sex marriages 1"5 or, perhaps, why heterosexuality
is better than homosexuality.' Yet, this is an approach that is clearly wrongheaded. First, it seems plausible to suggest that different-sex marriages would
be better for some people and that same-sex marriages would be better for
others. Even bracketing which kind of marriage or relationship is "better," it
would hardly make sense to preclude individuals from marrying because their
marriage would not be optimal. For example, financial difficulties can play an
important role in causing marital break-ups" and thus it might seem that
indigent individuals might not have "optimal" marriages. Yet, in Boddie v
Connecticut," the Court struck down Connecticut's restriction of the ability of
indigents to get a divorce," at least in part because that would prevent them
from remarrying.' ° Further, the Zablocki Court struck down Wisconsin's

163. But see text accompanying note 90.
164. Some states only allow those first cousins to marry who cannot reproduce through their union. See
Ariz Rev Star Ann § 25-101(B) (West Supp 1997) (at least sixty-five years old or one is unable to
reproduce); 750 I1 Comp Stat Ann 5/212(4) (West 1993) (at least fifty years old or either party
permanently and irreversibly sterile); Ind Code Ann § 31-11-1-2 (Michie 1997) (at least sixty-five years
old); Utah Code Ann § 30-1-1 (Supp 1997) (at least sixty-five years old or both at least fifty-five and one
cannot reproduce); Wis Stat Ann 5 765.03 (West 1993) (female has to be fifty-five years old or either one
submits affidavit that party is permanently sterile).
165. Collett, Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage,47 Cath U L Rev at 1249-50 (cited in note 160); Lynn D.
Wardle, Legal Claimsfor Same-Sex Marriage: Efforts to Legitimate a Retreatfrom Marriage by Redefining
Marriage, 39 S Tex L Rev 735, 754-55 (1998). But see generally Mary Becker, Problems with the
Privatization ofHeterosexuality, 73 Denver U L Rev 1169 (1996) (arguing that same-sex relationships are
morally preferable to opposite-sex relationships).
166. See Duncan, From Loving to Romer, 12 BYUJ Pub L at 239 (cited in note 103) (discussing "those
who seek to use the courts to accomplish a radical and dangerous agenda-the reordering of marriage to
reflect the alleged equal goodness of homosexuality and heterosexuality"). But see William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
A History of Same-Sex Marriage,79 Va L Rev 1419, 1422-23 (1993) (suggesting that it is precisely this
attempt to subordinate gays, lesbians and bisexuals within society that makes same-sex marriage bans
constitutionally offensive).
167. See John F. Coverdale, Missing Persons: Children in the Tax Treatment ofMarriage,48 Case W Res L
Rev 475, 504 (1998) ("Financial stress during the course of marriage is a significant source of marital discord and
contributes to the break-up of marriages.").
168. 401 US 371 (1971).
169. Idat371.
170. Id at 376.
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imposition of a financial litmus test for those who wish to marry,17
notwithstanding that such marriages might not be "optimal" and
notwithstanding the state's legitimate and substantial interest in promoting the
welfare of out-of-custody children.'72 Marriage involves too important an
interest to be denied to all who would not have "optimal" marriages, even if
there were objective criteria to determine which unions would qualify.
Suppose that it were true in some objective sense that families with
children were somehow better than families without children and thus that
childless marriages would not be optimal. This would hardly be a reason to
prohibit the latter and were this any other context such a claim would never be
advanced. One can imagine the outcry were someone to introduce legislation
73
limiting marriage to only those who could and would have children.'
F. THE LOVING ANALOGY
Same-sex marriage opponents seem not to appreciate that many of the
arguments offered in support of such bans might analogously have been made
in Loving. For example, some commentators imply that because same-sex
couples seek to secure their marriage rights through the courts rather than
simply allow the legislatures to make the relevant decisions, these couples are
disingenous in their claims of wanting to be treated as (merely) equal citizens. 4
After all, it is argued, by attempting to get the courts to recognize a right to
marry, these couples are attempting to "foreclose an important public
debate."'75
Yet, first, there is no reason to think that such recognition would in fact
close off debate. For example, Roe v Wade"6 has hardly foreclosed debate about
abortion. Second, even were debate thereby foreclosed, that hardly should
suffice as a reason to preclude individuals from having their rights recognized
in court. Presumably, these commentators would not have claimed that the

171. But see Zablocki, 434 US at 404 (Stevens concurring in the judgment) ("Thus, within the class of parents
who have fufilled their court-ordered obligations, the rich may marry and the poor may not.").
172. See id at 388.
173. See Mark Strasser, Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the AntimiscegenationAnalogy, 25
Suffolk U L Rev 981, 1011-1012 (1991) (suggesting that were there a law passed preventing the elderly
from marrying, the law would be declared unconstitutional and the legislators would be thrown out of

office).
174. See Coolidge, Playing the Loving Card, 12 BYU J Pub L at 235-36 (cited in note 22). See also Wardle, A
CriticalAnalysis, 1996 BYU L Rev at 5 (cited in note 35) ("Constinstionalizing same-sex marriage raises serious
concerns about the delicate balance of federalism, about judicial overreaching, and about principles of
representative government").
175. See Blair, ConstitutionalEqualProtection, 47 Cath U L Rev at 1239 (cited in note 87).
176. 410 US 113 (1973).
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Lovings: (1) should not have gone to court but, instead, should only have tried
to persuade the Virginia Legislature to allow them to marry, or (2) were
seeking special rights by seeking to have their right to marry vindicated in the
courts.
Further, these commentators would never claim that the Loving Court
should have reached the opposite conclusion so as not to foreclose public
debate, notwithstanding that the state of Virginia offered a political process
argument, claiming that the Supreme Court should "defer to the wisdom of
the state legislature in adopting its policy of discouraging interracial
marriages." 1" The Court wisely rejected the state's argument, even though
doing so overrode the will of the people.
When attempting to establish that what is at issue in the same-sex marriage
controversy is different from what was at issue in the interracial marriage
controversy, commentators sometimes understate the strength of the
opposition to interracial marriage that existed at the time Loving was decided.
For example, Professor Duncan suggests that "Loving is a case in which public
morality triumphed over social pathology,"" as if interracial marriage was in
accord with the public morality of the time. Yet, polls in the 1990's indicate
that a substantial number of white Americans disapprove of interracial
marriages, 9 and it is clear that attitudes toward intermarriage "have changed
dramatically over the last quarter-century."'80 Thus, a very significant
percentage of whites disapproved of such marriages when Loving was decided.
It is neither clear that public morality at the time permitted such marriages
nor, for that matter, that the current opposition to same-sex marriage cannot
be attributed to social pathology. The point here of course is not to suggest
that Loving should have been decided differently if in fact interracial marriages
contravened the existing public morality-on the contrary, this is to suggest
that public morality is not the appropriate test to decide something that
involves such a fundamental interest as the right to marry."'
177. Loving, 388 US at 8.
178. Duncan, From Loving to Romer, 12 BYUJ Pub L at 239 (cited in note 103).
179. See Juliet A. Cox, Comment, Judicial Enforcement of Moral Imperatives: Is the Best Interest of the
Child Being Sacrificed to Maintain SocietalHomogeneity, 59 Mo L Rev 775, 785 (1994) ("Forty-five percent
of white Americans responding to a 1991 Gallup poll
disapproved of interracial marriages").
180. See James Trosino, Note, American Wedding Same-Sex Marriageand the MiscegenationAnalogy, 73
BU L Rev 93, 93 (1993). See also Robert A. Pratt, Crossing the Color Line: A HistoricalAssessment and
PersonalNarrative of Loving v. Virginia, 41 How L J 229, 241 (1998) (In the past thirty years, "social
arttmdes regarding interracial marriage have undergone a major transformation").
181. See Strasser, The Challengeof Same-Sex Marriage7 (cited in note 156) ("It simply will not suffice to
say that because this is a democracy, the issue of who may marry whom should be determined by a popular
vote. This is a constitutionaldemocracy, where the will of the majority is constrained by the protections that
have been guaranteed by federal and state
constitutions.").
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Professor Lynn Wardle rejects the comparison between interracial marriage
and same-sex marriage because he suggests that this involves a comparison
between "legal classifications concerning marriage based on racial characteristics
and those based on homosexual conduct."'82 He seems to be arguing that the
former involved regulation of immutable characteristics while the latter
involves the mere regulation of behavior.'83 Yet, he seems not to appreciate the
force or possible application of his own argument. For example, Virginia might
have claimed that it had no interest in punishing anyone because of his or her
race. On the contrary, Virginia was merely trying to prevent certain kinds of
sexual behaviors, namely, interracial sexual relations, and precisely because
behaviors rather than immutable characteristics were at issue its antimiscegenation statute was constitutionally permissible.
Professor Wardle suggests, "Intuitively, there is a distinction between
immutable racial classifications, which are logically irrelevant to legitimate legal
policies, and personal sexual behavior choices, which are of substantial social
concern, especially regarding marriage. ' The state of Virginia might have
agreed wholeheartedly and then claimed that because it was merely trying to
preclude personal behavioral choices, especially where the institution of
marriage was involved, its statute precluding interracial marriage should have
been upheld.
Allegedly, same-sex marriage bans are permissible because they are "directly
related to one of the fundamental purposes of marriage laws-that is, the
regulation of sexual behavior and protection of the basic unit of society-the
family."' 5 Yet these are exactly the kinds of arguments that Virginia might have
offered. One need only consider how Florida defended its anti-miscegenation
statute that punished interracial fornication and adultery more severely than
intra-racial fornication. The state claimed merely to want to "prevent breaches
of the basic concepts of sexual decency, ' a characterization with which the
Supreme Court refused to quarrel." Presumably, Virginians shared the view of
Floridians that interracial sexual behavior was indecent whether within or
outside of marriage.'88 Presumably, both Virginia and Florida might have
claimed that their interracial marriage bans were merely protecting their
citizens' understandings of the "proper" family.
182. Wardle, A CriticalAnalysis,1996 BYU L Rev at 75 (cited in note 35) (italics added).
183. See id at 82 ("Furthermore, race is an inherent condition, but homosexual behavior is chosen behavior.").
184. Id ("race is an inherent condition, but homosexual behavior is chosen behavior").
185. ld at 75.
186. See McLaughlin, 379 US at 193 (cited in note 47).
187. See id.
188. At the time Loving was decided, Florida also had a statute prohibiting interracial marriage. See
Loving, 388 US at 6 n 5.
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Perhaps the most useful argument for the state of Virginia would be
Professor Wardle's claim that "distinctions based on activities or relations are
different than distinctions based on immutable traits, and sexual activity may
be regulated in many ways to a greater extent than gender classifications."' 9
There, he is suggesting that heightened scrutiny is not appropriate where
relations, rather than traits, are being regulated."9 Yet, if indeed same-sex
marriage bans do not discriminate on the basis of sex, properly understood,
because they instead classify on the basis of behavior or relations, then Virginia
presumably should have argued that interracial marriage bans, when properly
understood, should not be thought to discriminate on the basis of race but
instead on behavior or relations. Were Professor Wardle's analyses convincing,
they would cast a whole new light on how Loving should have been decided.
IV. CONCLUSION

Same-sex marriage opponents offer several arguments in their attempts to
show why former interracial marriage bans are not even analogous to current
same-sex marriage bans.' 9' Yet despite protestations to the contrary, many of
the arguments offered to establish the permissibility of same-sex marriage bans
might have been analogously offered by the state of Virginia to justify its own
interracial marriage ban.
That these arguments might have been used analogously to support antimiscegenation laws should not be thought to establish that such theorists do or
even would have supported such bans. On the contrary, it seems clear that
these theorists find interracial bans so obviously wrong and same-sex marriage
bans so obviously right that they cannot even see the ways in which their
current arguments against same-sex marriage were once used to support
statutes like the one at issue in Loving.
Loving is important for a variety of reasons. For example, it makes clear
how distinctions can be invidious, notwithstanding their popular acceptance,
and why a state's prohibition of something as fundamental as the right to
marry should be examined closely to make sure that the reasons articulated are
both legitimate and important. When, for example, something like the ability
189. Wardle, A CrilcalAnalysis, 1996 BYU L Rev at 86-87 (cited in note 35).
190. Professor Wardle suggests that the claim that same-sex marriage bans discriminate on the basis of sex "is
based on a pun-the double meaning in colloquial language of sex, referring both to gender and to sexual
relations." See id at 86.
191. See Duncan, From Loving to Romer, 12 BYU J Pub L at 243 (cited in note 103) ("The Loving analogy is
simply inapposite."); Wardle, A CrticalAnaysis, 1996 BYU L Rev at 75 (cited in note 35) (analogy between samesex marriages and interracial marriages "is inapposite") and see generally Coolidge, Playingthe Loving Card, 12
BYUJ Pub L 201 (cited in note 22).
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to reproduce through the union of the parties is required for some to marry, is
ignored when others wish to marry, and is a disqualijingcondition when still
others wish to marry, it should be clear that a fundamental interest is being
denied for specious reasons. While Loving of course does not establish that the
right to marry a same-sex partner is constitutionally protected, it and the
subsequent right to marry cases establish the necessity of closely examining the
articulated state interests allegedly justifying such a marital prohibition. It is
difficult to understand how the reasons thus far articulated to justify same-sex
marriage bans could ever withstand the requisite scrutiny. Indeed, the utter
speciousness of the reasons offered by many commentators allegedly justifying
same-sex marriage bans only serves to bolster the view that the state has no
important, legitimate interests in depriving an entire group of such a
fundamental right.

